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Abstract
The question of resistance as a pleasurable activity continues to

be a theme within cultural studies. This essay argues that the ideology
of pleasurable resistance is precisely the way that capitalist patriarchy
maintains its hegemony through seduction. By focusing mainly on

the writings of John Fiske and his employment of Foucault´s power/

knowledge couplet and Barthe´s appropriation of jouissance, it is
argued that the discursive subject position overlooks the value of the
psychoanalytic understanding of fantasy identification. It is suggested

that a more radical understanding of jouissance as developed within

a psychoanalytic view of the split-subject needs to be addressed (or
reinstated) into visual cultural studies research in order to take the

seductive workings of fantasy into account. The essay ends with a call
for a return to neo-Gramscian counter-hegemony through “popular

visual education.” The difference between cultural studies and “visual”
cultural studies is one of emphasis only. Throughout the essay the visual
has been absorbed by the larger general category.
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Like the alchemist´s philosopher’s stone, which was a substance

that supposedly changed other metals into gold or silver, and like
the fabulous diamond in the film Romancing the Stone which was to
fulfill every possible fantasy, cultural studies has found its stone in the

pleasures of “resistance.” In the consumerist markets of transnational
capitalism the resisting subject clears the space of agency in what would

otherwise be a Baudrillarian sutured “ecstasy of communication”
whereby all possible meanings have already been precluded, including
the message and the receiver. While the question of “resistance” has

been a laudable goal in visual cultural studies, I wish to interrogate
this concept, perhaps adding a little tarnish to the stone´s brilliance.

My primarily argument is that this concept, as it is currently deployed

in postmodernism, is over-romanticized in its suppositions (cf. Curran,
1990; Schlesinger, 1991; McGuigan, 1992).

The “popularity” of resistance emerged during a time of neo-

conservatism of the mid-’80s when the transformations of the New
Right—Reagan/Bush in the US., Mulroney in Canada, Thatcherism in
Britain, Helmet Kohl in Germany—required a response by a Left which

had lost its authorial agency. One response to this crisis of the Left was

provided by the neo-Gramscian proposal for a radical democracy as

developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). The “new social movements”
at that time (feminism, green politics, animal rights, identity politics)
were to be politically “articulated” by way of a discursive organization

in a chain of equivalences between different forms of oppressions and

struggles to form a counter-hegemonic force that was to oppose the
current power bloc. Such a horizon of opportunity presented itself

at a time when these social movements already had “antagonistic”
relationships with the state; its members required no “conscientization”

(cf. Paulo Freire) to make them aware of the inequalities of power and

oppression. The decade that followed the publication of Laclau and

Mouffe’s Hegemony & Social Change, however, saw the New Right make
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continual gains in dispersing and recuperating these movements under

the need for greater self-autonomy and less state control. A “culture of

narcissism,” as Christopher Lash in 1978 argued, had fully emerged.
The “war of position” had been lost, along with a troubling confirmation

that class, race and gender as markers of stable identity, were no longer
entirely adequate to theorize this change.

What arose simultaneously was the eventual supplantation

of neo-Gramscian hegemonic struggles of “the people” with a social

imaginary filled by Foucault´s power/knowledge couplet and de
Certeau´s tactic/strategy games where “resistance” in both cases was

coded as “good” because it was against the dominant ideology. The

Left was characterized as avoiding the practicalities of everyday life,

too concerned with the macro structures of society and expecting major

social transformations which never came. These new social explanatory
forms, supplemented by reception theories and ethnographic studies,

which were more fluid in their applicability to capture the “morphing”
conditions, seemed to answer the call of agency. However, the stress
placed on the “pleasure” of resistance, as developed by one strand of

cultural studies, has been particularly confusing in the wake of these

post-Gramscian developments. It almost appears as if the pendulum has
swung the other way. I refer to the difficulty of identifying resistances
and struggles that are merely complicit with the power bloc from those

that are antagonistic to it. With the concept of “false consciousness” as
an illusory representation of reality having lost ground amongst postMarxist circles, and with the theorization of Althusser making ideology

fundamental to the human condition, the question of social progress

remains “undecidable” unless a fuller democratic potential can be
realized and “false consciousness” re-coded as still a useful concept.
The valorization of “resistance” in cultural studies, with its subsequent

flattening out of its qualities and forms, has overlooked the education
of subjects opposed to the manifold and varied forms of power, which
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was part of the Gramscian moral tradition of cultural studies in the first

place. This has been replaced with a naive belief that consumers are

more clever than was once thought. The stress on “resistant pleasures”
has brought with it a tiresome and banal corollary: “the masses are not

to be taken as cultural dopes” (cf. Morris, 1988). This essay explores
the suspicion that this is precisely the subject-ideal that contemporary
capitalism desires: subversive and de-stabilized identities who seek new

modes of enjoyment through forms of romanticized resistances made
possible by the “deterritorializations” of capitalism as exemplified by
liberalist pluralist subject positions.

More specifically, the thesis entertained here is that the ideal

subject of capitalist consumption is the exact inverse of the ideal subject

of “real” socialism. In the socialist system, according to Havel (1985)
and Salecl (1994: 48), the private citizen did not believe in the system;
the regime was criticized privately but obeyed publicly. Capitalism is a

system which is resisted publicly through democratic social actions, but
obeyed privately in the belief this is the best that is possible. Socialist

ideology functioned as long as the public rituals were obeyed. Capitalist
patriarchal ideology maintains itself by constructing a symbolic space,
which creates formations of fantasy whereby spectators are allowed to

escape the traumas of everyday reality through forms of romanticized
resistance. Capitalism’s staging of “the fantasy of resistance” through
commodity culture provides the satisfaction that the subject’s own

ideal ego has been achieved by exercising agency and free choice. The
argument to be developed here is that many of the examples that are
said to offer popular resistances of pleasure. Shopping, music and

computer videos, fashion, game and quiz shows, soap operas, the

science fiction genre and reality television are the constitutive forms of

capitalist ideology, while “resistance” is the very surplus that comes
with consuming enjoyment. “Resistance” to these forms is the very
“symptom” of contemporary capitalism. Following Zizek (1989: 21),
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I want to suggest that this consumer “enjoyment” (jouissance) which
makes the participation in these forms possible, already includes the

“tactics” of resistant self-reflexivity. It adds to their enjoyment, which

is what I mean by romantic resistance being a “surplus.” In other
words, the ideological “being” of the ideal capitalist subject is offered

a fantasy structure whereby resistance is symptomatic of the very logic

of late capitalism. How else to account for the apparently obvious
premise that the most successful popular cultural forms are the ones

that are most financially successful because they reach such wide and
diverse audiences? Hegemony operates precisely through popularity

that is enhanced by the polysemic nature of a text (Lewis, 1991). Both
complicity and contradiction are “factored” into the “bloc buster” texts

(films, music and computer videos, books) including the academic
market as well. As Ronald Jones sarcastically remarked, “Spending time
devising the next confrontational culture is how the culture industry
organizes the time of the intelligentsia” (in Hewison, 1990: 9).

In the preface to their second edition of Escape Attempts (1992/1976),

Cohen and Taylor confirm the cynicism of “resistant” postmodernism:

“twenty years ago we were fascinated by the ingenious and desperate
ways in which people tried to ignore, subvert or resist paramount

[dominant] reality. Now, we would have to start with the ways in which

paramount reality ignores, subverts and resists itself all the time. At

the same time there has been a spreading out, a popularization. The
tricks, routes and programmes of the elite have become better known
(if not actually available) to all ...” (16-17, my emphasis). Films like

Robert Altman´s The Player or Roland Emmerich´s Independence Day,
for example, self-consciously “wink” at their audiences, letting them
know that what they are watching is simply exaggerated artifice. Said
differently: “the emperor is naked and the media trumpet forth this

fact, yet nobody seems really to mind—that is, people continue to act
as if the emperor is not naked ... “ (Zizek, 1994:18).
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Resistance as symptom is a paradoxical element within

capitalism. Peter Sloterdijk (1987/1983) names it “cynical reason.”
Cynical reason describes the ideal capitalist subject: resisting on the

outside but still believing on the inside. Zizek (1989:29) rephrases Marx’s
“false consciousness” of “they do not know it, but they are doing it,”
into its contemporary postmodernist reality: “they know very well

what they are doing, but still, they are doing it.” Romanticized forms
of resistance exhibit this form of “enlightened false consciousness.”
Even when one knows the particular hidden interests at work in the
various capitalist forms of consumerism, they are not renounced, rather

the pleasure is found in enjoying and believing in the subversions that
their fantasy formations allow. As Cohen and Taylor (1992/1976) argued

some time ago, following Erwing Goffman´s lead of “role-distance,”

mockery, irony, and skepticism as forms of self-consciousness of the
social predicament provide “escape attempts” to protect oneself from
the fear that one’s behavior is determined by the rules of the cultural

setting. “It did not mean however that they now acted against the

institution, it more usually meant that they went along with its edicts
with an easier heart, reassured by the distance which they could

mentally maintain from its social arrangements” (56). Such behavior,

as Zizek remarks, is different from Sloterdijk´s term kynicism inspired
by Diogenes which represents popular plebian rejections of the official
culture by means of irony and sarcasm (see Scott, 1985). The forms of

popular culture discussed here do not fall into this category which are
informed by a fundamental “antagonism.” On the contrary, in an act

of “romanticized resistance,” as for instance when women of lower

socio-economic standing are “liberated” by replacing “masculine money
with feminine knowledge” by playing The New Price is Right (Fiske,
1990: 137), an ideological fantasy or unconscious illusion structures

their social reality, and their desires to fill their lack. In this case,
this unconscious fantasy is a liberal patriarchal one: the imaginary
metaphorical displacement of working class women and housewives to

Romancing the Stone
be like their husbands by having equal economic power; an aspiration
which is a denial of the actual existent conditions. Their enjoyment

(jouissance) masks the trauma of their inability to achieve and occupy
this subject position given their present material conditions. As Zizek
(1989) argues, “the place of illusion is in the reality of doing itself” (33).
Under this formulation, Fiske´s ‘art of making do” becomes “they know

that, in their activity [e.g., playing the quiz show] they are following
an illusion, but still they are doing it” (ibid., my italic).

“Power, Power Everywhere,
but not a Drop of Freedom !”
Fiske (1991) has strongly addressed Baudrillard´s characterization

of popular culture and television in a postmodern age, arguing that his
theory of postmodernism is largely stuck at the level of macro-structure

and misses the concrete, contextualized practices where the socially
produced images and socially positioned subjects intersect. The play
of signs, the refusal of genre categorizations, and the pastiche style of

postmodern sensibility belong largely to the middle- and upper-classes
who can afford to play such “dress up” games. For the lives of the
subordinated the story is quite different. In Power Plays; Power Works

(1993) Fiske puts into play the figure of a group of “homeless” men
watching Die Hard within the confines of their shelter’s VCR system.

One of the men gets up and abruptly turn the video off when Bruce

Willis, the film’s protagonist eventually begins to side with police
authority. Fiske refers to this incident several times throughout his
book as a way of demonstrating the conflicts of power that surround
any media reception. He argues that this incident demonstrates the
agency of resistance despite the fact that these men occupy one of the
most powerless and helpless subject positions in society.

Another often cited demonstration of active agency comes from
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“critical” (post-Marxist) educational theories of Michael Apple (1979;
1982), Henry Giroux (1981), and Paul Willis (1981). To avoid the charge
of Marxist structuralism which characterized their writings in the early

’80s, they (much like the “late” Foucault of The History of Sexuality)

turned their attention to “resistance theories” (e.g., Giroux, 1983). This
trajectory easily drifted toward questions of “self-identity” which began

to play on the academic hit-parade. The “hidden curriculum,” as the
unintentional curriculum that emerged “behind the backs” of both

students and teacher, was theorized by the complexities and ephemeral
nature of Foucault´s knowledge/power dynamics. A particular good
early example comes from the semiotic theory of television viewing
developed by Hodge and Tripp (1986:183-187). They give the example
of the Australian soap opera Prisoner, whereby school aged children
(11-13) identified with its story line set in a women’s prison by

perceiving themselves as prisoners of the school system, subject to
similar punishments, experiencing the same hierarchy between “them
and us,” and identifying their teachers as its wardens. Arguably such

an interpretation could well change as they grow older and become

parents and teachers themselves. Hodge and Tripp dealt only with the

general consensus of the school children as to the soap’s popularity.
Gender differences were not explored, nor were those children who
disliked the soap questioned for their contradictory readings. Further
research, if desired, could identify the economy of other existing power

inequalities. Their study, however, made it obvious that such “resistant”
meanings attributed to images were inseparable from the material social
conditions of those who produced them.

The study by Hodge and Tripp, and Fiske´s suggestive

“homeless” example demonstrate how the micro and macro come
together in resistance according to Foucault´s theory of power. The

inequalities of both the institution of education and the state can be

teased out by theorizing everyday life. As Fiske argues, the construction
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of “meanings” as part of a set of social and power relations is never static

but fluid; it is the site/sight/cite of constant contestation and struggle.
But is this, in itself, a limiting proposition? The multiplicity of the axes
of social difference, i.e., sex, gender, class, race, ethnicity, ableism,

age, are continually evolving into new kaleidoscopic arrangements.

Power, as Foucault had conceptualized it and Fiske had appropriated

it, is forever enigmatic. It does not possess us, but rather it invests and
turns us into an element in the play of multiple forces, which seem to

have no specific point of origin. In McGowan (1991) summative words:
“it [power] is productive; it is only exercised by individuals but never
possessed by them [i.e., the individual is constituted by power]; and

it is involved in every social relation” (127). In this formulation “the
individual exercises power at certain times and in certain places as
a functionary of power’s intentions, not her own” (ibid.). Foucault

explicitly supports the rationality of power as “characterized by
tactics that are often quit explicit at the restricted level where they are

inscribed (the local cynicism of power)...” (Foucault, 1980: 95). In other

words, Foucault´s view of power constitutes the cynical individual of
postmodernism.1 Resistance is always theorized against the position of
dominant power which, in turn, forms Fiske’s definition of “popular

culture.” “[T]here can be no popular dominant culture, for popular
culture is formed always in reaction to, and never as part of, the forces
of domination” (1989:43).

Split Subject of Psychoanalysis versus the
Poststructuralist Discursive Subject
Foucault dismissed the “split-subject” of psychoanalysis; i.e., the

dualistic vision that pits an inhibiting power against an autonomous

and oppressed subject (Copjec, 1990:13-15; Salecl, 1994: 95). Instead,
his positive concept of power conceives resistance as emerging from the
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process that installs the subject (the body) into the social. Law is a norm

based on power. There is no power without the potential of refusal or
revolt (resistance). Intersubectivity, what Dews (1987:198) calls “the

reciprocity specific to the social domain,” is by and large, diminished

in Foucault´s thought. Psychoanalysis in contrast, conceptualizes the
negative force of power in the sense of rejecting one’s own desires.

Power is a force of exclusion or repression. In the theoretical stance

of Fiske, fantasy as the seat of ideology drops out. Resistance cannot
be theorized along the lines of fantasy formations; rather it becomes
a reactive formation against power structures.2 The homeless men,

for instance, sided with the weak against the strong. “By erasing the

end of the movie, when the normal [power relations] reasserted itself,

they made sense of the temporary victories of the weak as if they were

permanent” (Fiske, 1993:129, original italic). The “as if,” which is the
seat of ideology, is under theorized. These homeless men exhibit the

cynical attitude referred to earlier. There is resistance all right, but
the subsequent “freedom” is rather empty since no action to achieve

particular purposes has taken place (cf. McGowan, 1991:130). The
strength of informing this account with the fantasy structures that
support the homeless men’s sense of maintaining their “as if” structures,

in short their “reality,” would move the question of “resistance” onto a

whole other level. Fiske (1993) does develop the sociological grounds
as to why the spectacle of violence is enjoyed by men in a patriarchal
capitalist society (Chapter 6). Only by dissolving the fantasy structures
that support the viewing of spectaclular violence would it become

possible for these homeless men to redirect their energies into other,
more active forms of resistance, perhaps organizing themselves into a

collective. “The subject can ‘enjoy his symptom’ only in so far as its logic
escapes him—the measure of the success of its interpretation is precisely

its dissolution” (Zizek, 1989:21). In brief, unconscious knowledge is
what structures their fantasies.
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The difficulty with theorizing resistance along Foucault’s

trajectory is that it lends itself to an analysis of micro-politics based

on place or location. Foucault´s rhetoric of its complexity leaves an

unbridgeable gap between these micro-procedures of power and
any formulation of its centralization.3 The “disciplinary procedures”

that operate at the level of “micro-power” seem to by-pass ideology
altogether since they are not made accountable to some knowable or
unknowable external power or organizing principal.4 Fiske (1993:34, n.9),

for example, utilizes the concepts station and locale as developed by

Bourdieu´s concept of habitus and Gidden´s notion of locale to develop

his “power plays, power works” thesis. The question, however, now
becomes whether the sense of place (“locale,” “habitus,” “station”)
is still conceptually adequate to theorize power in a postmodern

electronic world? Is this not also a romantic holdover? As Best and
Kellner (1991:23) point out, Foucault´s wide-ranging analyses of power

omitted “any discussion of the key contemporary mechanisms of
power and social reproduction: media, consumption, fashion, leisure,

and semiotics.” If Meyrowitz´s (1985) thesis of “no sense of place” is to
be accepted, the electronic media such as television and the computer

have undermined the traditional relationship between physical setting
and social situation. Space (cf. Harvey, 1989) and not place, is where
such theories concerning power should take place. In Forget Foucault
(1987/1977) Baudrillard argued that power as Foucault had theorized

it was obsolete in an age of simulacra determined by models, codes,
information, and the media. Power had become abstract, unlocatable

in either the micro or macro structures. In The Electronic Disturbance
(1994), members of the radical left Critical Art Ensemble conceptualize

power as absent and invisible. In an electronic age they argue, it is a

cyber-elite—postmodern Scythians—who possess “nomadic power” in
their ability to compress time and space at will by occupying the power

of the decentralized and deterritorialized cyberspace. Electronic space
controls the physical logistics of manufacture. “In most cases sedentary
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populations submit to the obscenity of spectacle, and contentedly pay
the tribute demanded, in the form of labor material, and profit” (16).

In sci-fi dystopias like Fortress, Blade Runner, and Total Recall even
the memories and fantasies have been artificially implanted by a

corporate cyber-elite colonizing the last vestiges of proletarian private
resistance.

How can “sedentary servants,” in Critical Art Ensemble terms,

cause a “disturbance,” under such nomadic domination? What can

“paramount” or “dominant” reality mean in a hyperreal world? Where
is the Gramscian “power bloc” located if power is so decentralized?

What are you resisting when you cannot locate in any adequate way,
except perhaps from feelings of melancholia and apocalyptic doom

what it is that is oppressing you? (Jay, 1994:35) Such questions raise the

possibility that the “multiple,” fluid or morphing subjectivity is exactly
what late capitalism needs. On one level, it allows a moneyed class to

be mobile, fluid, and nomadic like the cyber-elite themselves. “Multiple

selves” can enhance the multiple effects of pleasure through even more
consumption. Here the mantra of modernist categories of class, color,

ethnicity, gender, ages and so on as critical categories no longer hold. If
they do, they can become counter-productive for profit as in “color”

and “green” capitalism. Post-fordist capitalism treats them as designer

categories. Any combination of these signs produces a specific target
population. As Mercer (1990:426) has argued, this radical pluralism has

resulted in “the challenge of sameness” where “no one has a monopoly on

oppositional identity.” (emphasis in original) The sign of being /black/
for instance, is dispersed over a wide discursive field. Patricia Williams

(1991), a lawyer from Harvard deconstructs her experience of being
barred from Benetton because she was /black/, but here her color

was profitably misread and overdetermined by the clerk who refused
her entrance. The racial signifier /black/, under other circumstances,

identified members of an underclass that did not have the money to
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shop there which she did. Her fluidly blocked—which under other
circumstances would have never happened—Williams’s anger was
chandelled in exposing Benetton’s racist practices.5 Clothing companies

such as Cross-colors and Mondetta have already recognized the counterprofitability of maintaining exclusive categories, as has the fashion

industry that is profiting from cross-dressing and “designing women”
(cf. Gaines and Herzog, 1990). Perpetual cultural deconstruction of
meanings and identities as excesses of desire propels consumerist

capitalism. In this respect, Madonna’s continued proliferating identities
makes her The material girl par excellence.x

On another level, capitalist marketing targets specific life-styles

as so many fractal spaces whose descriptive composite is generated
by a computerized profile made possible by the “electronic body”

each of us already has, registered through bank accounts, consensus
questionnaires, social insurance numbers, income tax returns, credit
ratings, organizations to which we belong, and so on. Although as

agents with “free will,” we do not have to empirically identify with

these discursive “market segmented” subject positions prepared for us
by capitalist engineers, the very fact that post-fordist designer capitalism
reproduces itself through such a broad range of consumerist interests
testifies to the success and profit that the pluralization of difference
brings. Chaos theory,6 which has to deal with indeterminacy and

uncertainty through stochastic statistical analysis, is precisely the very
ideology necessary to manage transnational capitalism which has to
configure (factor in) this plurality of differences. The proliferation of
cable and satellite channels which will meet the whims of every possible

interest group provides the alibi of liberal pluralism that differences are
being served, and that the “end of ideology” and the “end of history”
is indeed here despite critical analysis from the Left to claim otherwise.
What can “resistance” possibly mean under these circumstances?
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In Seduction (1990/1979:8), the book that immediately followed

Forget Foucault, Baudrillard makes the following suggestive remark:

“that seduction represents mastery over the symbolic universe, while power
represents only mastery of the real universe” (original italic). With seduction

we enter into the Imaginary and the “reality” of fantasy, what might

more adequately described as the contemporary cyber-space of the
mind, where “the sublime object(s) of ideology” (Zizek, 1989) are to
be found; where the really “real,” or virtual real is simulated fantasy.

Hegemony and seduction occupy the same territory (Miller, 1990). As
Cora Kaplan (1986:162) adds, “the reader identifies ... most of all with

the process of seduction” (my emphasis). The interrogation of psychic
investments which go into fantasy provide a way to go beyond the
“cultural populism” (cf. McGuigan, 1992) of resistance. To theorize

how readers/viewers of images and films are caught up in these webs

of power requires the supposition of fantasy. However, reading/
viewing cannot, in and of itself, be radically individualized and any
generalizations that have been attempted by psychoanalysis and

textual analysis have led to a stalemate. In other words, taken to their

radical extremes, psychoanalysis which “theoretically” deals with
an N=1 results in a specificity which cannot be generalizable, while

ethnographic approaches which use sociological variables (social class,
gender, age and so on) as pre-given categories often end up in reductive

generalizations and conflictual findings. As Rodowick, who might be

counted as one of the early few psychoanalytic theoreticians questioning
any direct correspondence between desire and a sex/gendered subject
position, has this to say:

Despite the achievements of psychoanalytic film theory and

textual analysis in the past twenty years, I would insist that all

claims made about processes of identification in actual spectators,
powerful and important as they may be, are speculative. In my view

the analysis of forms of enunciation, or point of view, in fiction
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films may tell us a great deal about ideological representations

of gender differences. However, they can tell us nothing definitive
about the forms of sexual identification, or the potential meanings,
produced with respect to actual spectators.

(Rodowick, 1991:viii, my emphasis).

Walkerdine (1986;1993) is perhaps one of the few researchers

who has tried to bridge this psychoanalytic-sociological divide in

cultural studies by attempting to provide an explanation for the role

which certain fantasies play in specific family situations through a selfreflective and cautious ethnographic approach. Her research suggests
that the available fantasy formations, which are consumed, are crucial
to understanding resistance as a “romantic” ideological form.7

Our sense of self-identification to various socially created

subject positions cannot be denied; feral children aside, no one escapes

socialization. But we are dispersed subjects, overdetermined by some

positions and not others. In Laclau and Mouffe´s (1985:111) turn of
phrase, “This field of identities which never manage to be fully fixed, is the field

of overdetermination” (original italic). The paradox of overdetermination

means that self-identification is “articulated” by a particular element

which otherwise remains as a subordinated part to self-identity as a
closed “whole” system, i.e., our sense of ourselves as moi, as a selfassured ego. As we have seen with the example of /black/, as a “free
floating signifier” (Laclau, 1977) in particular context like the Benetton
store, the identity of Patricia Williams was overdetermined by it,

whereas in another context her position as a Harvard lawyer has more
determining power. As dispersed subjects each of us is subjected to a

variety of discourses differently. The riddle of postmodern political
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subjectivity comes to mind: What do a trade unionist, a racist, a
Christian, a wife-beater, and a consumer have in common? Answer:
They all can be the same person! (Ross, 1990). Fiske makes no mention who

it was amongst the homeless who turned off the film. Did he represent

the wishes of all these men? Did he hold a place of privilege because he
was a leader? Did that leadership come about because of his rhetorical
power? or due to his physical strength? Was their fantasy of resistance
merely a cynical repetition?

Can it be that Baudrillard´s “ecstasy of communication”

is closer to describing the way ideology works if contradictory
readings are equally accounted for? After all, the Hodge and Tripp

example confirms the structural similarities of power in all modernist
institutions: schools, asylums, police departments, corporations,

hospitals, religious organizations which continue to function despite

their inherent contradictions. Accommodation and complicity is as much
of this reproductive process as is resistance. These are all examples
of “total institutions” (Goffman, 1961) which have built in structural

forms of power along with built-in safety features for their criticism.
They are like Bakhtin´s “loophole” texts, anticipating the objections and

faults to their very structure. The difficulty of attributing specificity to
the media/reader couplet prompts me to ask whether the continued
vogue in popular cultural studies isn’t inadvertently supporting

a fantasy structure of resistance which is the very mechanism that
allows patriarchal hegemony to reproduce itself through consumerist
seductions? As Todd Gitlin (1991:336) once asked, “does it engage in

the politics in the strictest sense ... or does it simply make the most of
consumption?”

Questioning Jouissance: “Enjoy Your Symptom More
than Yourself”8
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Gitlin’s question is a difficult one to answer. In one sense,

subversive resistance provides great pleasure as developed in the
well-known and (by now) well-worn thesis by de Certeau (1984),

where the subordinate’s uses of “tact” prevail over the dominant’s
“strategies” of containment. The same may be said of Fiske (1987; 1989

a, b; 1990; 1992) and Stam (1989) in their interpretations of television
series, game shows and films respectively with their appropriation

of Bakhtin´s notion of carnivalesque opposition. Stam (1989:197) has

eloquently analyzed Woody Allen’s Stardust Memories as brilliantly

displaying Bakhtin’s notion of a “loophole text,” a filmic text which
anticipates, in advance, all possible criticisms of itself and its director.
Yet, despite this, the journalistic reviews charged the film with the very

faults that it had already charged itself. For me, this indicates that the
effects of the text far exceed the inner workings of its form, no matter

how clever that form may prove to be. Stam enthusiastically embraces

the resistant practices of the carnival, and yet I would temper his
enthusiastic assessment of the subversive potential of the “cinematic”
carnival with Umberto Eco’s more sobering assessment of the carnival
as “an authorized transgression deeply dependent on a law that it only

apparently violates ... [T]he powerful have always used the circenses

to muffle popular rebellion, just as the contemporary mass media,
instruments of social control, operate a ‘continuous carnivalization of
life’ “ (in Stam, 1989:91).

In cultural studies, perhaps Janice Radway (1984) has been

given the most quotable credit in recent years for introducing this

resistant view in her ethnographis study of women reading romance

novels who identify with a particular feisty heroine who fights against

her domineering male antagonist. Fiske´s encapsulation of resistance

as the “art of making do” with what’s at hand, and the political use
of pleasure by women in popular culture, especially in women’s

genres of soap operas, romance novels, melodramas, the fashion
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industry, shopping for pleasure, and popular music require cautious

assessment. Their locations, by and large, are shaped by institutions

already “structured in dominance” (Hall, 1980: 134). This is an extremely
difficult issue to think through since all texts are constituted by aspects

of utopia and ideology (Jameson, 1981). Fiske constantly reminds his
readers that the potentiality of disruption, subversion and liberalization

always exists in the bodily excesses of jouissance; i.e., in carnivalesque
pleasures where bodies escape being managed and disciplined by
the social order. Despite such assurances, I believe it is still a highly

contentious proposition to underestimate the license given by the
prevailing social order to allow such forms to exist as a “strategy of

containment” (Eagleton, 1981). Without such allowances the discursive
rhetoric of “democracy” as the best that can be currently achieved

could never be maintained. Jouissance is itself, under-theorized and

a problematic concept. French feminists (Cixcous, Irigaray, Clément,

Montrelay) wrestled the term away from Lacan precisely because
Lacan admitted that feminine jouissance in particular existed outside

the containment of the Symbolic Order. As the Symbolic Order´s limit,
they found the excesses of jouissance as a liberation from phallocentrism.
Writing around the same time, Barthes´ (1975) appropriation of the

Lacanian term as developed in his “pleasure of the text” thesis, gave

him leverage to break with orthodox notions of ideology critique. This

fit neatly into Fiske´s further reappropriation of the term into popular
culture as a form of resistant bodily evasion.9 However, because Fiske
rejects the “split-subject” of psychoanalysis, theorizing Foucault’s

discursive subject instead, his interpretation of jouissance fails to
recognize that resistance coupled to jouissance as he interprets this term

is the seat of ideology par excellent. From a Lacanian psychoanalytic view
enjoyment, as jouis-sense (“enjoy-meant,” or “enjoyment-in-meaning”),

means a mis-recognition of the very “substance,” or “kernel” of one’s
desire which remains hidden and unknowable. In contrast, Fiske’s

interpretation of jouissance is comparable to plaisir in Roland Barthes
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sense—mundane pleasure that confirms one sense of identity. Under
these circumstances, resistance as pleasurable meaning means avoiding

the Real (unconscious) of one’s desire. Access to such knowledge

would mean paying for it with a loss of enjoyment. The stupidity of
enjoyment as “resistance” is only possible on the basis of ignorance,

or unconscious non-knowledge.1 0 Facing the “kernel” of one’s desire
is a terrifying and fearful event, one where “freedom” means breaking

the symbolic reality in which one is embedded. Here jouissance takes
on quite a different meaning. In Zizek’s qualifying phrase:

What should be pointed out here is that enjoyment (jouissance,

Genuss) is not to be equated with pleasure (Lust): enjoyment if

precisely ‘Lust im Unlust’; it designates the paradoxical situation
procured by a painful encounter with a Thing that perturbs the
equilibrium of the ‘pleasure principle.’ In other words, enjoyment
is located ‘beyond the pleasure principle.’

(Zizek, 1993:280, n.6)
Fiske’s employment of Barthe’s term jouissance throughout his

writings is more closely related to the pleasure principle of plaisir, and to
the more familiar experience of catharsis than it is to the psychoanalytic

realm of jouissance as defined above. I believe a case can be made for
equating “resistance” as a postmodern form of catharsis. Catharsis has

the same elements of jouissance as Fiske uses the term, namely as a “loss
of subjectivity” that seems to escape the control of culture. Doesn’t the
cathartic purging of fear and pity, which characterizes the classical

sense of tragedy, fall under plaisir, as pleasure contained within the
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social order? In the famous Lacanian (1982) seminar on the “ecstasy
of St Teresa,” is her jouissance to be read as still under the recuperation
of the Church’s power (after all, she is in ecstasy with God)? Or, is

she now experiencing the delight of her own body, orgasmically and

metaphorically represented by Irigaray´s (1985) “two lips”? How radical
has her escape from the Church Father’s been? (see Ash, 1990)

Linda Williams (1991) has further complicated the issue of

jouissance. Again, her discussion presents the possibility of naming
resistance as a cathartic experience of containment. She has cleverly

pointed to other filmic bodies in excess—in ecstasy —as they relate to
specific film genres which have low cultural status, but a high repetition

of consumption: overwhelming pathos in the “weepy” melodramas, the
orgasmic body in pornographic films, and the violence and terror of the

body in horror films. All three forms, which relate to sex, violence, and
strong emotion, would fit Fiske´s “Barthian” definition of jouissance as

a primal orgasmic experience of fantasy (see note 12). “Visually, each of

these ecstatic excesses could be said to share a quality of uncontrollable
convulsion or spasm —of the body ‘beside itself’ with sexual pleasure,

fear and terror, or overpowering sadness” (Williams: 1991:4). These
primary embodiments of pleasure, fear, and pain, which range from

the masculine pole (pornography) to the feminine pole (melodrama),
with horror in between for adolescents “careening wildly between

the two masculine and feminine poles,” (ibid.) are played out over
the bodies of women in extremely complex ways. If Williams is to be

followed, pleasure becomes an extremely complicated issue as the
cinematic gaze bounces all over the sex/gender landscape with no
easy way of separating the boundaries between pleasure, fear and

pain. Often pleasure turns to pain and visa versa as in the practices of

sadomasochism. For a teenager, fear can be a pleasurable experience
while watching a horror film (Glover, 1992).

We have now reached a point where sex/gender confusions
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abound in terms of subject positions which any one text offers (Adams,

1991; Rodowick, 1991). Evasive pleasures may be found in the new
genres of pornography developed specifically for women, heterosexual
couples, bisexuals, gays, lesbians, as well as for the transgendered

community. The recent phenomenon of male “weepies,” melodramas
like Dad have appeared. Is it possible to interpret these bodies in excess

which are allowed to let off “bodily steam,” so to speak; to ejaculate,

shudder, spill blood, sob and cry as a way to avoid the “normal”

and banal disciplined existence of mundane life as a containment

strategy by dominant hegemony? We are back full circle to the
question of catharsis. The difference being that such societal catharsis
is not classically defined as tragic—purging fear and pity—but its

postmodern varieties which purge yet other anxieties of the age: the
insecurities related to sex/gender and power. Isn’t the border between

Barthes´ weak dichotomization between plaisir/jouissance represented
by the very institutionalized forms of cathartic release: Greek tragedy,
Roman gladiatorial fights, Medieval public executions, and today’s
postmodernist spectatorial forms of audience participation, like

telethons, live aid, sports spectaculars and rock concerts? With the loss
of authority and faith and trust in the Symbolic Order, the question of
perverted jouissance once more emerges on the landscape. What role
does hysterical and obsessional behavior as it relates to the Law have

for young people today? How can be identify desire which is potentially

transformative from the drive impulses that are more destructive?
Euphoric “hooliganism” that young men experience during soccer

matches, or the “slam” dances of skinhead culture, or the drug-induced

euphoria of rave dances, strictly speaking as resistant displays of
jouissance surely are not to be interpreted positively. Rather, they are
symptomatic of the psychic pain that young people suffer today, where

“skin games” (piercing, tattooing and cutting) have radical ways to
“feel” (jagodzinski, in press).
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There is no radical psychology of desire incorporated into

cultural studies, at least to my knowledge, which would help theorize
how the identification in fantasy with a heroine by a “housewife” who

regularly consumes specific novels Janice Radway describes, leads
to actually changes in the real conditions of her existence. Her experience
of jouissance (as plaisir), and the cathartic release that comes with it

may simply be one of emotional release, a way to sustain a hope that
her future will change. These are accommodations to the structure,

rather than challenges to its limits. It may well be that this form of

empowerment provides her with more space by challenging some
of her husband’s patriarchal practices. But should such resistance be

interpreted as liberating? Concessions to some of her demands on her

husband’s part may well be made in order to maintain a relationship of
subordination. Put pejoratively speaking, if the “natives” are restless,

then yield to some of their demands; give then some “rope” so that

their “work” can go on. Isn’t this precisely what this melodrama does?
As Schröder concludes in his discussion of Dynasty:

In other words, TV melodrama establishes an aesthetic contract

with its viewers. It offers them an opportunity to explore individual
and social tensions and to face behaviour which is shocking or

threatening to prevailing moral codes. Furthermore, it promises
that the experience will end on a note of reassurance and moral

acceptability, and be stranded with frequent implausibilities so

that viewers can suspend involvement and withdraw to a position
of superior distance, should they begin to feel uncomfortably
affected by the fictional distance of agony and immorality
(Schröder:1988:76).
After the viewing of each episode of Dynasty, after the reading of every

romance novel, the social structure remain essentially the same. It would
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have to take a lot more than just reading such romance novels for a
woman to get away from the reality of an abusive relationship.

In the mid-90s, Ien Ang (1996:91) reaffirmed that Sue Ellen

character in Dallas was by far the most popular character with whom
women identify with. As a heroine, she represents the very embodiment

of the melodramatic imagination—masochistic and powerless—a
surrender to forces outside the subject. As a symbolic realization of a

popular feminine subject position this alone should continue to send
out the message that feminist struggles are far from over. Yet, there is

persistence that “reading the romance” is a resistant form that should

continue to be honored. Ien Ang (1996:107), when reviewing Radway’s

pioneering work, claims that the psychic investment in the romance
fantasy should be taken seriously. “And it [the romantic fantasy] is

this enduring emotional quest that, I would suggest, should be taken

seriously as a psychical strategy by which women empower themselves

in everyday life, leaving apart what its ideological consequences in
social reality are” (emphasis mine). Ang is uncertain how feminism
should respond to this, but she has no difficulty in chastising Radway
for her rationalist feminist proposal to overcome the ideological function
of the pleasure these women experience. Recognizing the psychic

investment in the romantic fantasy is not the problem here. Rather it is

the very pleasure these women experience as a form of “resistance” and
“empowerment” which is precisely how they avoid the Real of their
desire. They enjoy their “symptom” (i.e., being powerless and caught
in a masochistic relationship) more than themselves. The “repetition”

of the romance fantasy is sustained by maintaining that the external
circumstances they find themselves in cannot be changed—the psychic
investment to make such a change is not worth it. It would cause

too much “suffering.” Children and financial circumstances seem to

make it “impossible.” Rather than facing the “freedom” that comes

with jouissance in the psychoanalytic sense, they absolve themselves
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of agency and displace it on external circumstances. As a further

complication, if these women feel guilty and morally responsible for the
state of their marriage, then there is no need to examine the ideological,

political, and economic conditions of patriarchy that sustains their
unhappiness, depression, and frustration. Reading the romance is a

way of making the present oppressive circumstances tolerable. Such
pleasures (e.g., like Sue Ellen’s occasional extra-marital affairs) often

prevent them from falling into a completely cynical position which

comes by completely blaming external circumstances. Instead they
remain “good” housewives rather than falling into total rudeness

and hate toward their husbands. Such a form of resistant agency acts
like a “crutch,” keeping hope alive that circumstances may change.

In Derrida’s (1987) sense, where the frame itself is part of the framed

content, the romance fantasy is the frame that frames these women into
patriarchal ideology. It is the supplement which must be continually

consumed in order to keep the picture tolerable. And that picture calls
for an immobility regardless how strong the heroines are.

Looking now into the new millennium, a decade later, have

things significantly changed since the mid-90s? Can we say that
postfeminism of the liberal variety, exemplified by such television

series as Sex in the City and the reality shows that have begun to pervert
marriage (Joe Millionaire, The Bachelor, The Bachelorette, Meet My

Parents, Married By America) have significantly altered the complaint?
Admittedly, liberal feminism has introduced a “revolution” in the

romance novel. It may be said that today’s postmodern heroine has

been transformed into playing a “stronger role.” She has been given
the strength of character to challenge her male antagonists. The same

may be said for heterosexual and lesbian detective novels. No one
would deny that the reading of such romance and detective novels
may potentially contribute to a housewife’s eventual departure from
an intolerable situation, or that lesbian detective stories don’t provide
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positive fantasy models for women who are questioning their own sex

preferences, or searching for confirmation regarding their own life
styles. But, an answer which speaks to the reasons for change confined

to the influence of media alone is undedcidable. Much like there is no

causal link between watching video violence and committing real acts of
brutality, a finding which is often repeated by media researchers even in

controversial areas like pornography and televised and filmic violence,

but continuously rejected by the pro-censorship moral guardians of

society, the benefits of romance novels to women have been overexaggerated (Clancy, 1992; Purdie, 1992). Surely the social relations

and the material conditions of the support communities which circle

and contextualize the reading of romance are much more influential
in determining the direction women’s lives will take?

It is often forgotten that such liberalist melodramatic romance

forms have contributed to the gains of very small strata of white middleclass women. Issues of race, ethnicity, abelism complicate this situation

enormously. On another register, the reception of soaps by working

class women and by women in “third world,” as well as what were once
one-party state communist countries, namely Russia, find American
soap operas fanciful projections of life styles they could never hope
to achieve. They read them as being “unrealistic,” confirming more
what they don’t have than what they hope to have (Brown, 1990 a,b).

Soviet capitalism fashioned a decade later has been conditioned and
shaped by these very unattainable fantasies. Joyrich (1988; 1990:162-63)

is especially perceptive in her account of showing how the tropes of
female proximity, fluidity, and “nearness” which are codes of “feminine

textuality,” offered as subversive alternatives to masculine models
of identity, support the psychology of the perfect consumer. And, as

forcefully argued by Rosemary Hennessy (1993, 2000), this emergent
“new woman” is the exemplar for the logic of late capitalism.
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Concluding Thoughts
The dangers of resistant pleasure have been well voiced

throughout cultural studies. It has been my thesis that such resistant
pleasures enable capitalist consumerist ideology to reproduce itself.
Cynical reason is one resistant response; the resistant repetition
involved in the consumption of romance is yet another. Cathartic

release through the media experiences of violence, melodrama, and

erotica (pornography) purge the body of its pent up desires to change

social conditions. In order for capitalist patriarchy to maintain its
hegemony, seduction through fantasy formations must provide a broad
enough range of subject positions to psychically satisfy and preserve

the existent class, race, sex/gender, ethnic, age dynamics. The relation

between fantasy and lived experience becomes the key site/sight/cite

for counter-hegemonic intervention. For groups like ACT UP the fantasy
formations of AIDS created by the media, the state, and the medical
profession have been exposed (e.g., Crimp, 1988), consequently their

resistance have been “antagonistic” rather than the complacent kind
developed in this essay. For a more active form of resistance it seems

that a return to a neo-Gramscian agenda of “popular education” is in

order (Hall, 1996). Ang (1996) worries how feminist cultural workers

might avoid the “moral high ground” when confronting the fantasies

of their non-feminist informants. It seems to me that a visual cultural

studies education that steers, or oscillates between the fantasy subject
positions offered by any given text and an investigation of a personal

psychic investment and commitment to specific fantasies by informantsstudents-co-researchers and researcher or research team would be one

possible way to level the moral ground (jagodzinski, 2002). Leaving

ethnographic investigations at the level of discourse theories alone
enables an abdication of social and ethical responsibility by all those

concerned. If the context and the “already ready” historical discourses
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determine the subject then the subject must continually reflect the

guilt or makes excuses why the situation cannot be changed. Only by
recognizing the impossible gap which exists between the enunciated
subject and the subject of enunciation can responsibility be taken for

the fantasies we identify with. Perhaps then, certain fantasies which
prevent “freedom” towards more democratic social relations can be

rejected and replaced by more enabling fantasies. But this may not be
a pleasurable matter.

Notes
1. McGowan (1991: 131-134) provides three succinct criticisms

of Foucault´s theory of power which could be characteristic of cynical
reason. First, freedom conceptualized as resistance is empty. ‘All power

in Foucault is equal, just as all resistance is approved’ (132). Foucault

never qualifies the resistance by questioning its goals. Second, freedom
is exercised in resistance rather than in power. In other words, he has

not an articulated sense of the positive sense of power—especially its
capacity to achieve collective goals. Power has a ‘distinctly negative

charge’ (133) which bifurcates his theory into power as conservative
action against resistance as transgressive action. And third is Foucault´s
difficulty identifying when ‘power is not an evil’ (134).

2. Fiske (1987) dismissed the usefulness of psychoanalysis in

his study of television, confining its possibilities to film alone. The
Foucaultian decentered subject of discourse replaced the ‘split-subject’

of psychoanalysis in his approach to cultural studies. John Rajchman
(1991) has usefully elaborated on the different understanding of the
‘self’ between Lacan and Foucault by examining their respective ethical
stances.

3. In contrast to Althusser (1971), for instance, who conceives these
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micro-politics of power as part of the Ideological State Apparatuses

(ISA’s). The individual is ‘already ready’ interpellated by the ideological
big Other (the state).

4. Here I follow Copjec’s (1994) critique of Foucault. The

‘unknowable’ nature of the organizing principal of society is crucial
here. Society as an ‘open system’ can still be usefully theorized by
speculating on the cause which is occluded from the system but which
nevertheless establishes the system in the first place. This first principal

functions as a phantasy structure of ideology. According to Copjec,

Foucault’s rejection of psychoanalysis places him as a ‘historicst’ who
grounds being at the level of appearance and avoids any questions of
desire (as fantasy) which is registered negatively (as absent) in language.

‘[W]e are calling historicist the reduction of society to its indwelling
newtwork of relations of power and knowledge’ (6).

5. Benetton’s racist advertising has been well exposed and

documented. See Giroux (1994); Back and Quaade (1994); Thévenaz
(1995).

6. Chaos theory is a science of process rather than state, of

becoming rather than being. It incorporates the erratic and the irregular,
discontinuity and disorder, oscillation and wild swirls into a science
that searches for new laws that encompass these patterns so as to make

a strong claim about the universal behavior of hypercomplex systems.
Chaos means a special complex kind of prediction and probability

assessment. Irregularity can now be analyzed now that powerful
computers available (see Gleick, 1987).

7 .Her 1986 study examined the pleasures of violence by working

Romancing the Stone
class men. The fantasy provided a ‘romantic’ hope that they could get

ahead in the world through physical struggle ‘with their hands’ alone.
It becomes a specific masculine response to overcome humiliation and

cowardice. In her 1993 study with June Melody she identifies how the
fantasy formation of the ‘orphan child’ in the film Annie enables six
year old Eliana to cope living with her dysfunctional family. Pleasure
is found in Annie’s escape from her drunken mother and finding true
happiness with a wealthy man.
8. See Zizek (1991).
9. Fiske´s (1987:50-51) definition of jouissance as developed by

Barthes goes as follows: ‘Jouissance, translated variously as bliss, ecstasy,
or orgasm, is the pleasure of the body that occurs at the moment of the

breakdown of culture into nature. It is a loss of self and of the subjectivity
that controls and governs the self—the self is socially constructed and
therefore controlled, it is the site of subjectivity and therefore the site of

ideological production and reproduction. The loss of self is, therefore,
the evasion of ideology. ... The orgasmic pleasure of the body out of
control—the loss of self—is a pleasure of evasion, of escape from the
self-control/social control ... an escape from meaning ... .’

10. See Zizek (1989:68-69) for jouissance as theorized more as a

question of plaisir. Fiske (1987:229-230) admits that ‘the distinction
between plaisir and jouissance is often difficult to make in practice.…’
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